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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 






-v- . . Case No. 18123 






BRIEF OF RESPONDEIJT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted of theft by receiving stolen 
property, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Co~e 
Ann., § 76-6-408 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
·J 
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found 
guilty on October 6, 1981 in the Second Judicial District 
r 
Court, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding. Appellant 
was sentenced October 19, 1981 to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year and not more than 15 years in the Utah 
State Prison. Appellant was placed on probation and 
imposition of the prison term was suspended on condition that 
appellant serve 40 days in jail and pay $1,250 in restitution 
at $50 per month. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of appellant's 
conviction and sentence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant was employed as a security guard for a 
private company whose clients included Browning Arms Company, 
a weapon manufacturer and research company in Mountain Green, 
Morgan County, Utah (T. 14).1 Upon arriving at Browning 
Arms for his graveyard shift (12-8 a.rn.) security patrol, 
appellant would receive a master key which would open all the 
doors in the building except one {T. 26).- Appellant had 
access to the gun library, where the Browning Company kept 
historical guns and other manufacturers' guns for testing (T. 
24). Included in the gun library was a Browning 9-mm. high-
power pistol with serial number 72089 which appellant was 
later charged wfth unlawfully receiving (T. 25). 
An annual inventory of the Browning Arms Company 
weapons was conducted in December 1979 and was completed by 
about December 15 (T. 22). The Browning pistol, number 72089, 
was present when the December 15, 1979 inventory was completed 
(T. 22). Appellant terminated his employment as a security 
guard at Browning Arms on January 2, 1980 (T. 16). 
1Although there is a two-volume transcript in this 
case, all references herein will be to volume one. 
-2-
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Because there appeared to be numerous weapons missing, a 
special inventory was conducted in September 1980 and the 
weapon was listed as missing (State's Exhibit 1). 
Appellant was on security duty at night by himself 
and he was required to check the building's rooms for securely 
locked doors and exits and watch for fires every two hours. 
Appellant had access to the gun library. Appellant did not 
have a key to the locked cabinets in the gun library, but that 
was not an insurmountable barrier to appellant, as he 
explained to a co-worker in the fall of 1979. Appellant 
demonstrated to Trent Petri how it was done: 
(T. 42). 
One door would shut and latch from the 
inside, and the other one was shut with a 
dead bolt with a key. If you would push 
on the one with the dead bolt, push it in 
and hit that latch, both doors would open. 
After ftppellant quit working at Browning Arms, the 
security system was changed in February 1980 and a master key 
no longer opened the gun library (T. 28). In the late spring 
or early summer of 1980, W. R. Betz, a member of the Browning 
Arms Board of Trustees and a Browning gun /specialist, received 
a phone call from appellant, who did not identify himself (T. 
50). Appellant asked general questions about the gun after 
giving its description and stating it was a lightweight 
pistol, but appellant did not give the gun's serial number 
-3-
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so Betz had no opportunity to trace the history and ownership 
of the pistol. The same person phoned again about one week 
later and gave his name as Jan Graham. Appellant gave Betz 
his phone number but again he did not give the serial number 
of the gun {T. 51-53). Appellant did not reveal the owner of 
the pistol even though Betz expressed interest in buying it or 
getting a photograph of it (T. 50). 
Betz phoned appellant several times to inquire about 
the owner of the Browning pistol (T. 52). Appellant did not 
allow Betz to meet the owner or to photograph the gun. 
Appellant was ambiguous about the owner of the gun, except 
that the owner was a member of appellant's unit of the 
National Guard (T. 53). 
At a gun show in November 1980 at the Salt Palace in 
Salt Lake City, Betz saw the pistol for the first time when 
appellant and a~pellant's wife showed him the Browning pistol 
(T. 55). Betz recognized the weapon as a prototype, a one-
of-a-kind weapon (T. 55), and immediately checked the serial 
number (T. 56). Betz then reported the serial number to Allen 
Carver of Browning Arms, who researched t~e Browning Arms 
Company sales records but could find no sale of the weapon 
with that serial number (T. 57-58). Betz also wrote to the 
factory asking for a serial number trace but did not receive 
an answer to his query for six to eight months (T. 59). 
-4-
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After the November 4, 1980 phone call from Allen 
Carver stating that there was no evidence of a sale of the 
Browning pistol with that serial number, Betz phoned appellant 
and was tolc1 that appellant's "friend" han decided to sell the 
gun (T. 60). On November 19, 1980 appellant received from 
Betz $1,000 cash and a .357 magnum pistol with ammunition in 
exchange for the Browning pistol (T. 61). Betz had appellant 
sign a bill of sale which Betz had prepared (T. 61). 
Shortly thereafter, Betz, in consultation with 
Browning Arms Company, discovered that the Browning pistol was 
on the September 1980 inventory list of stolen guns from the 
Browning gun library (T. 62). On December 2, 1980 Betz gave a 
statement (T. 63) to the Morgan County Sheriff, who elicited 
the aid of the .Ogden City Police~Department. Brad Carver, an 
Ogden police detective, talked to appellant on December 5, 
1980 and appellapt said he did have possession at one time of 
the gunI which- he claimed to have purchased from a National 
Guardsman whose name he did not remember (T. 82). Appellant 
voluntarily accompanied Carver to police headquarters, where, 
upon entering the police building, he told Carver the name of 
./ 
the previous gun owner, "Jeff Smith" (T. 83). Appellant then 
gave his statement to the police. 
Appellant returned to the police department three 
days later with an apparent receipt from nJeff Smith" for 
-5-
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the sale of the Browning pistol (T. 91}. Merrill Smith, a 
personnel administrator at the National Guard State 
Headquarters, searched the Utah National Guard records back to 
1973 and he did not find the name of Jeff Smith in any of the 
personnel files (T. 91). In January, 1981 appellant was 
charged with theft, to wit: he unlawfully received, retained 
or disposed of a firearm, knowing that the property had been 
stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, with a 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof, a conviction from which 
he now appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S DETERMINATION THAT APPELLANT WAS 
GUILTY OF THEFT BY RECEIVING, RETAINING OR 
DISPOSING OF STOLEN PROPERTY. 
Appellant contends on appeal that the prosecution 
did not establish a prima facie case of theft by receiving 
because the prosecution did not prove each element as required 
by Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-6-408. Appellant correctly states 
that a "defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him 
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Appellant couples this 
presumption with his testimony and now assumes that the facts 
are to be viewed as he stated them. By looking only at 
-6-
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appellant's testimony and ignoring the other probative 
evidence, appellant argues that the evidence was not 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case; and it was 
therefore not sufficient to submit to the jury, and a motion 
to dismiss should have been granted. 
provides: 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-6-408(1) (1953), as amended, 
A person commits theft if he receives, 
retains, or disposes of the property of 
another knowing that it has been stolen, 
or believing that it probably has been 
stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds 
or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding any such property from the 
owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof. 
Under this theory of theft, the prosecution was required to 
prove: (1) property belonging to another had been stolen; 
(2) appellant received, retained or disposed of the stolen 
property; (3) at the time of receiving, retaining or disposing 
of the· property, appellant knew or believed the- property was 
stolen; and (4) appellant acted purposely to deprive the owner 
of the possession of the property. State v. Murphy, Utah, 617 
P.2d 399 (1980). In the present case, th~ jury fauna that the 
evidence was sufficient to establish these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, it is 
well established that it must appear that reasonable minds 
-7-
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necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt that appellant 
committed the crime. State v. Wilson, Utah, 565 P.2d 66 
(1977). Unless evidence compels a conclusion that as a matter 
of law evidence was inconclusive or so unsatisfactory that 
reasonable minds acting fairly must have entertained 
reasonable doubt that appellant did not commit the crime, the 
verdict must be sustained. State v. Newbold, Utah, 581 P.2d 
991 (1978); State v. Mills, Utah, 530 P.2d 1272 (1975). The 
evidence need not refute contrary allegations made by 
appellant if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. 
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980); State v. Howell, 
Utah, P.2d (Case No. 17407, decided June 30, 1982). 
The evidence, and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn 
therefrom, is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
fact finder's verdict. State v. Garlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761 
(1979). It is not the prerogative of this Court to weigh the 
evidence, but that of the fact finder to assess its weight and 
sufficiency. State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216 (1976). 
r 
Appellant claims that the prosecution fa'iled to 
present sufficient proof of three elements of the crime: 
(1) there was no evidence that the Browning high-powered 
pistol had been stolen; (2) there was no evidence that 
appellant had knowledge that the pistol was stolen; and 
(3) there was no evidence that appellant had acted purposely 
to deprive the owners of the possession of the arown1ng 
-8-
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pistol. The one element of theft by receiving, retaining or 
disposing stolen property which appellant concedes is that 
appellant had possession and disposed of the pistol. 
Appellant argues that there never was any direct 
evidence to prove the element that the property of another had 
been stolen, but that the evidence merely indicated the 
-Browning pistol was "missing." It is not a significant matter 
that witnesses stated the Browning pistol was "missing" rather 
than "stolen." Regardless of the semantic label attached, the 
evidence reveals that the Browning pistol was a prototype, 
one-of-a-kind, which was locked in a display cabinet in the 
Browning Arms Company gun library. There was direct evidence 
that after a September 1980 inventory, the Browning pistol was 
onv·a,stolen~weapons·-list·:given to the FBI,~indicating that the 
Browning pistol was· stolen and was not merely misplaced or 
"missing.":":.· Other direct ~evidence included· the testimony that 
the Browning pistol had not been sold and that the Browning 
Arms records did not show that the pistol had been properly 
borrowed by an authorized person. 
Circumstantial evidence of the element that the 
./ 
property of another had been stolen also -was presented by the 
prosecution. The Browning pistol was sold by appellant, who 
had easy access as a security guard to the weapons in the 
Browning Arms gun library, although appellant was not 
authorized to borrow or possess the pistol. Appellant also 
-9-
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demonstrated to other security guards how to unlock the gun 
cabinets by pushing on the doors and hitting the latches. 
There was also evidence of security problems at Browning Arms 
Company which appellant understood and which he could take 
advantage of without difficulty. Appellant had ample 
opportunity to unlawfully take the Browning pistol as ·he was 
on duty by himself during the graveyard (12-8 a.m.) security 
watch. The prosecution is not required to present evidence 
that appellant stole the Browning pistol, but must show that 
the pistol was stolen property. By looking at the facts and 
circumstances of appellant's employment as a security guard at 
Browning Arms Company, there is an indication that the pistol 
was stolen. From the direct and circumstantial evidence 
presented in this case, the ju·ry cou1a· rea'sonably- believe that· 
the pistol was stolen, regardless of who actually stole the 
pistol from Browning Arms Company~ 
Appellant also claims that the pistol could have 
been "raffled" or given to a Browning Arms employee, but this 
is mere speculation and highly unlikely that a weapons 
manufacturer would give away a rare and valuable pistol 
,,, 
instead of placing it in the company's historical gun library. 
There is no evidence that Browning Arms gave the gun away and 
the jury was entitled to believe that Browning Arms had not 
done so. 
The prosecution also offered evidence of the element 
of knowledge, which appellant claims was not shown by direct 
-10-
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or circumstantial evidence. Guilty knowle~ge that the pistol 
received, retained or disposed of was stolen can be proved by 
inferences and circumstances. State v. Zeman, 63 Utah 422, 
226 P. 465 (1924). Knowledge that property was stolen can 
seldom be proved by direct evidence and resort must be made to 
circumstantial evidence; however, no distinction is made 
between direct and circumstantial evidence in degree of proof 
required. Dutton v. State, 581 P.2d 856 (Nev. 1978); Russel 
v. State, 583 P.2d 690 (Wyo. 1978). 
Appellant denies knowledge that the property was 
stolen because of an alleged purchase from "Jeff Smith." Not 
surprisingly, Smith's whereabouts are unknown. Appellant's 
explanation is an old one--the pistol was acquired from a 
person who could never be located. The fact that appellant 
denies knowledge that the·-Browning pistol was stolen does not 
end the matter; it is just another fact and circumstance to be 
·) 
considered by the jury. United States v .. Luman, 624 F.2d 152 
(10th Cir. 1980). The United States Supreme Court has held 
that possession of recently stolen property, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is a circumstance from which the 
jury may properly draw an inference and find that the person 
in possession knew the property had been stolen. Barnes v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973). 
Moreover, whether the evidence of appellant's 
knowledge that the pistol was stolen is labeled as direct or 
-11-
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circumstantial is of no consequence. In Holland v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954), reh. denied, 348 U.S. 932 {1954), 
the court stated that circumstantial evidence is intrinsically 
no different from direct evidence: 
In both instances, a jury is asked to 
weigh the chances that the evidence 
correctly points to guilt against the 
possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous 
inference. In both, the trier of fact 
must use its experience with people and 
events in weighing the probabilities. If 
the fact finder is convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt, we can require no more. 
Holland, 348 U.S. at 140. See also: State v. Clayton, Utah, 
P.2d (Case No. 17518, decided May 6, 1982). 
In the present situation, the Browning pistol 
apparently was stolen shortly after an annual inventory in 
December 1979. Over a period of several months beginning in 
late spring or early summer of- 1980, appellant tried to obtain 
information on the Browning pistol and to determine if the 
Browning Arms Company had discovered that the weapon was 
missing. Appellant cautiously proceeded to gather 
information, phoning Betz, an expert on Browning weapons, but 
never giving Betz the serial number of the pistol and leaving 
, 
his name and phone number only in subsequent phone calls. 
Appellant refused to give the name of the gun's owner to Betz 
and did not show Betz the weapon until November 1980. 
Appellant attended gun shows and asked gun dealers about the 
-12-
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values of Browning pistols. When Betz told appellant that 
Browning Arms had not yet been able to find any sales record 
of the Browning pistol, appellant acted and it was clearly to 
his belief to quickly dispose of the weapon while Browning 
Arms personnel did not know the weapon was stolen. 
Appellant's careful gathering of information on the Browning 
pistol, his sale to Betz months later when Browning Arms 
Company had not yet discovered that the pistol was stolen and 
the questionable, improbable explanation of appellant's 
possession was sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury 
on the element of guilty knowledge that the weapon was stolen. 
Appellant argues that the prosecution did not 
establish sufficient evidence of guilty knowledge because the 
prosecution did not introduce the original thief to testify, 
implying.that a necessary element of the crime of receiving 
stolen property is that the State prove someone other than 
·} 
appellant stole the pistol, which presumably would establish a 
guilty knowledge nexus between the original thie~ and the 
appellant charged with receiving the stolen property. 
However, a eonviction under § 76-6-408 does not 
require that the actual theft be proven by the prosecution. 
The original theft is not an element of the crime. ~urphy, 
supra. Nor is the original thief required to testify on the 
element of appellant's guilty knowledge, as this element can 
be proved by circumstantial evidence. The prosecution need 
-13-
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not prove that the pistol was stolen by someone other than 
appellant in a conviction for receiving stolen property. 
State v. Watkins, 481 P.2d 689 (Mont. 1971). 
Appellant also argues that a presumption of guilty 
knowledge of appellant was not shown by the prosecution. It 
is the State's position that these presumptions were never 
invoked at the trial because the facts of the present case do 
not correspond to any one of the four theories of presumption 
of guilty knowledge as listed in § 76-6-408. However, simply 
because the instant facts do not invoke a presumption of 
guilty knowledge does not preclude a finding of guilty 
knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt that the pistol was 
stolen, as the jury could reasonably believe. 
The third element of receiving stolen property which 
appellant alleges was not established is acting purposely to 
deprive the owner of the possession of the property. 
Appellant bases this claim on his testimony that he bought the 
pistol and was the rightful owner. Whether appellant was the 
r 
rightful owner was disputed at trial and was a fact to be 
detemined by the jury. Appellant's testimony is not 
conclusive simply because he claims to be the owner of the 
pistol. The facts and circumstances indicate that appellant 
was not the rightful owner and the jury could reasonably 
believe so. The jury could find that by selling the Browning 
pistol to Betz, appellant intended to act purposely to 
-14-
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deprive the owners of the possession of the pistol. A sale of 
property by a person not the rightful owner lessens the 
likelihood that the true owner will recover the stolen 
property. Thus, the jury could reasonably find that appellant 
acted purposely to deprive the owners of the possession of the 
pistol. 
Appellant's only defense at trial was his own 
testimony and he now argues that his testimony alone serves to 
destroy all the other-evidence, leaving the State without an 
established prirna facie case. It is the respondent's position 
that a prima facie case was established when the prosecution 
presented some evidence on each element of the crime; it was 
then the jury's responsibility to weigh the evidence and 
~;,··ae·cide -on~·a verdict1···which-~cannot be overturned· u·nless ~-
reasonable minds must have had reasonable doubt. Newbold, 
supra. 
. •} 
Appellant said he met "Jeff Smith" in August 1980 at 
a National Guard Armory in West Jordan and that they talked 
about the Browning pistol. Appellant stated that "Smith" 
wanted $350 for the pistol, which he was selling because he 
was going to move. Appellant then claims to have made his 
first telephone contact with Betz. Appellant claims he saw 
both "Jeff Smith" and Betz at the November gun show in Salt 
Lake City. He said "Smith" still had the gun for sale and 
loaned it to appellant to show Betz. When Betz telephoned 
-15-
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about one week after the gun show and offered $1,000, 
appellant claims "Smith" also phoned about the same time. 
Appellant said he then bought the gun from "Smith" and sold it 
to Betz. 
The jury properly regarded appellant's self-interest 
as a factor in judging the credibility of appellant's 
testimony. The jury was not obliged to believe appellant's 
claim that he purchased the Browning pistol from "Jeff Smith." 
The jury is entitled to believe or disbelieve witnesses. 
State v. Fort, Utah, 572 P.2d 1387 (1977). 
Betz, a retired member of the U.S. Air Force , a 
member of the Board of Trustees of Browning Arms Company, 
executive director of the Browning Gun Collector's Association 
and a specialist in Browning:weapons, said appellant phoned 
him in late spring or early summer of 1980 about a 
lightweight, Browning pistol, while appellant claims he did 
nqt see the pistol until August 1980 and he also claims that 
he did not handle the pistol at that time. The phone calls 
interested Betz, who desired to see the pistol or obtain a 
photograph of it, but appellant claimed this was not possible 
/ 
because appellant did not have the pistol~ Appellant did tell 
Betz and Officer Carver that the owner of the pistol was a 
member of appellant's National Guard unit. 
Upon entering the Ogden police station, appellant 
told Officer Carver that he remembered the name of the 
pistol's owner, "Jeff Smith." Admittedly such person could 
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exist except for the fact that ·he was nowhere to be found and 
was not listed in the Utah National Guard records. 
During the conversation with Officer Carver and in 
the statement appellant gave at police headquarters, appellant 
did not mention a bill of sale he supposedly received when he 
purchased the pistol from "Jeff Smith." Certainly, the first 
step in exculpating oneself from an allegation of theft by 
receiving stolen property would be to show Officer Carver the 
receipt immediately when appellant was suspected of the crime. 
This apparently entered appellant's mind only after the 
conversation with Officer Carver and after reflecting on the 
bill of sale appellant signed for Betz when appellant solo the 
pistol to Betz on November 19, 1980. Three days after talking 
to Officer Carver·, appellant returned to the police department 
with.a_ bill of.~.sale." The.signatures were writte-n in:the same 
color of ink and apparently in the same handwriting. It was 
·J 
the_ jury's prerogative to .give this evidence whatever weight 
it felt it deserved. 
Appellant's testimony also indicates a number of 
highly unlikely coincidences. He claims "Jeff Smith" wanted 
to sell the Browning pistol in August because he needed the 
money to move. Appellant claims to have been interested in 
purchasing a Browning pistol for about a year, and when he did 
find someone willing to sell, appellant did not get a name or 
phone number, so appellant had no opportunity to contact 
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"Smith." Later, appellant discovered "Jeff Smith" at a gun 
show, and "Smith," who desperately needed to move, had still 
not sold the pistol and apparently had not moved, although it 
was three months later. 
Appellant claims that "Jeff Smith," someone who 
appellant alleged he had talked to for only one brief time 
before and whose name appellant could not even remember, 
agreed to allow appellant to "borrow" the pistol and walk away 
at a convention center with thousands of people milling around 
the gun show displays. It is highly unlikely that any "John 
Doe" or "Jeff Smith" would have such high _trust in his fellow 
human beings. The jury could reasonably believe that the 
alleged owner of a valuable pistol would not lend it to a 
stranger, but would walk with appellant to Betz's Browning gun 
display to inquire of the pistol's value. Appellant's wife, 
who appellant himself claims was present when he allegedly 
--
talked to "Jeff Smith," was not called as a witness, nor was 
any other person who could verify the existence of "Smith." 
CONCLUSION 
The record is replete with evidence that appellant 
committed theft by receiving, retaining or disposing of stolen 
property. The jury had an opportunity to hear the testimony 
and was in the best position to assess the witnesses' 
credibility from their demeanor and responses to questions. 
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This Court is obliged to assume· that the jury believed those 
aspects of evidence, and drew those inferences that reasonably 
could be drawn therefrom, in the light favorable to the 
vera i ct. 
Based upon the foregoing, respondent urges that the 
conviction and sentence of appellant be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this rrct\ day of July, 
19 82. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Gene# 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
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